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Abstract
This article discusses potential problems with the governmental structure of the European
Union. The Treaty on European Union (or “Maastricht Treaty”) establishes procedures for the
formulation of objectives and decision-making. Article C does speak of a single institutional
framework of the Union, and Titles V and VI envisage specific tasks for the Council and the
Commission. The European Parliament has no legal authority to take part in the procedure for
formulating objectives and decision-making. Pursuant to Articles J.7 and K.6, the European Par-
liament has only a limited right to be informed by the Presidency of the Council and to present its
position to the Council. The Parliament, however, may query the Council and take a position in its
annual report. Further, judicial review by the Court of Justice is not possible. In those instances
where the Council and the Commission share responsibility under a cooperative framework, they
fail to exercise such powers in accordance with procedural provisions of the EC Treaty.
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INTRODUCTION
Apart from its substantive rules, the Treaty on European
Union1 (or "Maastricht Treaty") establishes procedures for the
formulation of objectives and decision-making. These provisions
retain, on the one hand, changes in the procedural provisions of
the EEC, now EC, Treaty2 and create new decision-making
mechanisms for Titles V and VI on cooperation.- Under Article
L of the TEU,4 the rules of Community law do not apply to these
mechanisms. Nevertheless, Article C does speak of a single insti-
tutional framework of the Union,5 and Titles V and VI envisage
* Former Director-General, Legal Service, Council of the European Communities;
Professor at the University of Saarbficken.
1. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 IL.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-11) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREArms EsTnusKmc; THE
EunoPANx CommuNmEs (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987)).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], inrporating changes made by TEU, supra note 1.
S. TEU, supra note 1, tits. V, VI.
4. &d art. L.
5. Id. art. C, 1 1. "The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework
which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in
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specific tasks for the Council and the Commission.6 On the
other hand, the European Parliament has no legal authority to
take part in the procedure for formulating objectives and deci-
sion-making. Pursuant to ArticlesJ.7 and K.6, the European Par-
liament has only a limited right to be informed by the Presi-
dency of the Council and to present its position to the Council.
The Parliament, however, may query the Council and take a po-
sition in its annual report. Further, judicial review by the Court
of Justice is not possible. In those instances where the Council
and the Commission share responsibility under a cooperative
framework, they fail to exercise such powers in accordance with
procedural provisions of the EC Treaty. The applicable provi-
sions under Articles J. 11 and K.8 concern the composition of the
institutions.
Article C provides a link between the two legally independ-
ent policy-making bodies. Article C requires that the Council
and the Commission shall take responsibility for ensuring the
consistency of all foreign policy measures taken by the Union in
the context of its external relations, security, economic, and de-
velopment policy.7 This rule goes beyond Article 30(5) of the
Single European Act, which transferred responsibility for consis-
tency to the Council Presidency and the Commission.' It re-
mains to be seen whether the Council and the Commission can
fulfill their task where the Parliament is required to play an in-
creasing role in Community decisions. The requirement that
the Council define the framework for the Union's general polit-
ical development does not alleviate this friction, because Council
decisions are not binding upon the European Parliament.9
order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis com-
munautaire." Id.
6. Id. tits. V, VI.
7. Id. art. C, 1 2. "The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its exter-
nal activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and
development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensur-
ing such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in
accordance with its respective powers." IM
8. SEA, supra note 1, art. 30(5), 1 2. "The Presidency and the Commission, each
within its own sphere of competence, shall have special responsibility for ensuring that
such consistency is sought and maintained." Id.
9. Jean-Paul Jacqu6 & Simon Denys, Le R6le du Conseil Europ6en 28 (Institut
Europ~en d'Administration Public Working Paper 1984); SMrr & HER.oc, THE LAw op
TrH EEC, prelim. obs., arts. 145-54.
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I. CHANGES OF THE EC TREATY
A. The European Commission
The Maastricht Treaty proposes changes in the procedural
provisions of the EC Treaty in pursuit of a development that has
constantly experienced new impetus since the creation of the
Community. The Commission's function in the lawmaking pro-
cedure has not been basically altered by these procedural
changes. The Commission still retains a monopoly over propo-
sal-making wherever a Commission proposal is envisaged in the
legal basis chosen. Thus, a'proposal by the Commission is a pre-
requisite to setting in motion the legislative process. In addition,
the central provision of Article 149(1) and (3) of the EEC Treaty
has been incorporated into Article 189a(1) and (2) of the EC
Treaty.
Accordingly, the Council can depart from Commission pro-
posals but only by unanimous consent. The Commission can
also amend a proposal at any time prior to Council action.10 An
implicit conclusion derived from the Commission right to
amend proposals is that the Commission has the right to with-
draw its proposal so long as the Council has not yet taken any
action. Once a proposal is withdrawn, the procedural prerequi-
site falls away and the Commission has blocked the law-making
procedure.1
It is true that the Council, on the basis, of Article 152 of the
EC Treaty,1 2 and the Parliament, on the basis of the new Article
138b, 3 are empowered to request that the Commission submit a
proposal. Such a request, however, creates no legal obligation
that the Commission submit a legislative proposal. In so far as
such a duty exists on other legal grounds, the only action that
remains is the failure, to act pursuant to Article 175 of the EC
Treaty. Apart from this, the Parliament may table a motion of
censure on the activities of the Commission in accordance with
10. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189a(I)-(2).
11. GERT N=OLYsEN, Etnopciir I 149 (Baden-Baden 1991).
12. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 152. "The Council may request the Commission
to undertake any studies the Council considers desirable for the attainment of the com-
mon objectives, and to submit to it any appropriate proposals." RL
13. 1d. art. 138b. "The European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its mem-
bers, request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which
it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing this
Treaty." Id.
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Article 144.14 Experience has revealed that the Parliament has
recourse to this possibility only in a few cases and has in no case
attained the necessary majority of two thirds of the votes cast and
the majority of the members of the Parliament for such a mo-
tion.
The Commission's right to amend or withdraw a proposal at
any time is excluded pursuant to Article 189a(1) if the Council
and the Parliament draw up a joint text under the co-decision
procedure of Article 189b(4) and (5). In this instance, the role
of the Commission is limited to taking part in the Conciliation
Committee's proceeding and to taking all the necessary initia-
tives with a view to reconciling the positions of the European
Parliament and the Council. The limitations on the Commis-
sion's role in the joint law-making procedure is justified by the
requirement that the Council and Parliament must each agree
to the revised proposal negotiated within the Conciliation Com-
mittee. Article 189a(1) excludes the right to amend, and along
with this the Commission's right of withdrawal, only for
paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 189a, i.e., for the actual proce-
dures in the Conciliation Committee. Should the proceedings
of the Conciliation Committee fail to result in ajoint text, para-
graph 6 empowers the Council to accept the agreed upon ver-
sion of the text, although the Parliament may nevertheless reject
the Council's acceptance. 15 Because paragraph 6 is not men-
tioned in Article 189a(1), the Commission at this stage in the
proceedings retains its normal function of having an effect on
the lawmaking procedure of the Council and the Parliament by
amending or withdrawing its proposal.
14. Id. art. 144, 11. "If a moiion of censure on the activities of the Commission is
tabled before it, the European Parliament shall not vote thereon until at least three
days after the motion has been tabled and only by open vote." Id.
15. Id. art. 189b(6).
Where the Conciliation Committee does not approve ajoint text, the pro-
posed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted unless the Council, act-
ing by a qualified majority within six weeks of expiry of the period granted to
the Conciliation Committee, confirms the common position to which it
agreed before the conciliation procedure was initiated, possibly with amend-
ments proposed by the European Parliament. In this case, the act in question
shall be finally adopted unless the European Parliament, within six weeks of
the date of confirmation by the Council, rejects the text by an absolute major-
ity of its component members, in which case the proposed act shall be deemed
not to have been adopted.
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B. The Council
The changes affecting the Council made by the Maastricht
Treaty to the provisions of the EEC Treaty concern essentially
the composition of the Council. According to Article 146 as it
has stood up to now, the Council consisted of one member of
the government of each Member State.16 Under the revised Arti-
cle 146, a Member State may henceforth also be represented in
the Council by a minister who is not a member of the govern-
ment of this Member State.' 7 Such a minister must, however, be
empowered to represent the government of the Member State
on a binding basis. This ruling takes account of the circum-
stance that, in an ever increasing scale, rules are being adopted
at the Community level that, depending on the constitution of a
Member State, fall within the competence of regional bodies or
affect their interests.
The Maastricht Treaty takes account of this state of affairs by
incorporating Articles 198a to 198c into the EC Treaty. These
provisions created the Committee of the Regions, which the
Council and the Commission are to consult as provided by the
Treaty. Its function may be compared, in terms of the law-mak-
ing procedure of the Community, with the Economic and Social
Committee. The increased influence of the regions in the for-
mulation of the policy objectives of the Union is of special im-
portance for the German "Lander" in the Federal Republic,
where the same problematical issue led to a new version of Arti-
cle 23 of the Basic Law."'
Similarly, the revised Belgian Constitution, 9 under which
regions and communities were created as legal persons inte-
grated into the new federal state, provides in Article 35 that the
competence of central government exists only to the extent that
no responsibility of the communities or the regions is provided
for by the constitution or a special law. 20 Thus, the question of
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 146,. 1. "The Council shall consist of represent-
atives of the Member States. Each Government shall delegate to it one of its members."
Id.
17. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 146, 1 1. "The Council shall consist of a represen-
tative of each member-State at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government
of that member-State." I&
18. BGBl art. 23, at 2086 (1992) (Ger.).
19. Moniteur Belge, Feb. 12, 1994.
20. Id.
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whether a representative of a regional corporation is to be
deemed a minister within the meaning of Article 146 of the EC
Treaty will have to be judged according to national constitu-
tional law. Council decisions are still taken at the ministerial
level. The Permanent Representatives' Committee, provided for
in Article 151 of the EC Treaty,21 hitherto has the task of prepar-
ing the work of the Council. Article 8 of the Council's Rules of
Procedure of 6 December 199322 departs from this rule. Article
8 provides that the Committee may unanimously decide to adopt
a legal act by the written procedure.
The decision concerning acceptance of the legal act, how-
ever, remains reserved to the ministerial level. A further task is
potentially allocated to the Permanent Representatives in Article
189b(4), concerning the Conciliation Committee as part of the
co-decision procedure.23 Pursuant to this provision, the Concili-
ation Committee is composed of the members of the Council or
their representatives and an equal number of representatives of
the European Parliament. From a legal point of view, this provi-
sion does not appear to run counter to the fact that the Council
decides at the ministerial level. For it is not the task of the Con-
ciliation Committee to adopt legal acts but to aim at reaching
agreement on a joint text. Politically it remains to be seen
whether it is worthwhile to conduct the negotiations in the Con-
ciliation Committee instead of between the Members of the
Council, i.e., ministers, and the members of the European Par-
liament.
21. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 151(1). "A committee consisting of the Perma-
nent Representatives of the member-States shall be responsible for preparing the work
of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the council." Id.
22. Council Decision of 6 December 1993, art. 8, 0J. L. 304/1, at 3 (1993) [here-
inafter Rules of Procedure].
23. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189b(4).
The Conciliation Committee, which shall be composed of the members of the
Council or their representatives and an equal number of representatives of the
European Parliament, shall have the task of reaching agreement on a joint
text, by a qualified majority of the members of the Council or their representa-
tives and by a majority of the representatives of the European Parliament. The
Commission shall take part in the Conciliation Committee's proceedings and
shall take all the necessary initiatives with a view to reconciling the positions of
the European Parliament and the Council.
Id, Article 189b(5) provides that a common text elaborated in the Conciliation Com-
mittee requires the approval of both the Council and the European Parliament. Id. art.
189b(5). i
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The political discussions concerning the Treaty of Maas-
tricht led to a further change in the practice of the Council.
This was, however, not taken up in the Treaty on European
Union but led to a change in the Council's rules of procedure.
The conclusions of the European Council of 11 and 12 Decem-
ber 1992 in Edinburgh called for the Council activities to be
more open to the public.24 According to Article 3 of the earlier
rules of procedure of the Council, meetings of the Council are
not open to the public, unless the Council unanimously decides
otherwise. This has never happened in practice. In the version
of the Rules of Procedure dated 6 December 1993, Article 4 con-
tinues the principle of Council meetings not being open to the
public.25 Article 6 provides that Council policy debates on the
six-monthly work programme and also, if need be, on the Com-
mission's annual work programme, shall be publicly retransmit-
ted,by audiovisual means.26 Other debates can be conducted in
public in the same way, if the Council decides unanimously.
Although it may be desirable that the Council, as the central leg-
islator of the Community, discourages the impression of diplo-
matic secrecy, the process of taking concrete decisions will likely
be only slightly affected by the new Article 6 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure.
Article 7(5) of the new rules of procedure should open up
the work of the Council to greater public scrutiny.27 This provi-
sion establishes that the results of Council votes shall become
public when the votes on law-making instruments have been
cast. The same goes for votes in the context of the Conciliation
Committee under Article 189b and for unanimous decisions in
the framework of Titles V and VI of the Maastricht Treaty. In all
other cases, the Council may decide upon publicizing the results
of votes. Because there is no unanimity provision for such a de-
cision, Article 148(1) of the EC Treaty applies, and the Council
acts by a simple majority of its members.28
24. See E.C. BuLL, no.12, at 9 (stating that European Council reached agreement
on guidelines to implement measures "to increase transparency and openness in the
decision-making process of the Community").
25. Rules of Procedure, supra note 22, art. 4(1), OJ. L 304/1, at 2 (1993).
26. I. art. 6(1), O.J. L 304/1, at 2 (1993).
27. Id. art. 7(5), O.J. L 304/1, at 3 (1993).
28. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 148(1). "Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty,
the Council shall act by a majority of its members." I.
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C. The European Parliament
A significant step forward in the decision-making procedure
of the Community is found in the changes to the EEC Treaty
concerning the Parliament. The Parliament had been limited to
delivering an opinion on proposals from the Commission. The
submission of an opinion continues to be a procedural requisite
for decision-making by the Council, but such opinions do not
bind the Council as to its content.29 Similarly, this system was
also applied in the adoption of the EC budget, until an amend-
ment to Article 203 of the EEC Treaty by the 1970 and 1975
Treaties granted Parliament a genuine power of co-decision
alongside the Council. A corresponding contribution, however,
by the Parliament to legislation remained impossible. The Par-
liament, the Council, and the Commission could only reach an
understanding on a joint declaration of 4 March 1975,0 by
which a conciliation procedure was established. The object of
this procedure was to bring any positions on which the Council
and the Parliament deviated together into a joint position or at
least to bring about an approximation of the two divergent posi-
tions.
The Council's exclusive power of decision-making remained
unaffected. The conciliation process proved insufficient and
failed to fulfill the expectations incorporated into it. Concilia-
tion occurs in a committee in which the Council, at the ministe-
rial level, members of the Commission, and a Parliament delega-
tion meet. The position of the Council and Parliament are often
the result of compromises arrived at with great difficulty. There
is little opportunity for manoeuvre in negotiations on either
side. Thus, the conciliation process did not afford the Parlia-
ment any cooperative responsibility, because a joint declaration
cannot give rise to any change in the Treaty. This would have
presupposed the procedure pursuant to Article 236 as the law
stood at the time."
The Single European Act, through the introduction of Arti-
cle 149(2), empowered the Parliament to participate in the deci-
29. S.A. Roquette Frres v. Council, Case 138/79, (1980] E.C.R. 3333, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8703.
30. Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commis-
sion, o.J. C 89/1 (1975).
31. Article 236 of the EEC Treaty was repealed at Maastricht.
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sion-making procedure to a greater extent.3 2 The new provision
envisaged a procedure for cooperation between the Council and
the Parliament with participation by the Commission. In so far
as this procedure is necessary due to the legal basis chosen, two
readings of a proposal by the Commission take place both in the
Council and in the Parliament. If the Parliament rejects a com-
mon position of the Council worked out on the basis of a propo-
sal, the Council can only accept the position by unanimous ac-
tion.
Additionally, the Parliament has the right to propose
amendments. Should the Commission incorporate the Parlia-
ment's amendments into its proposal, the legal act can be ac-
cepted by a qualified majority in Council. Otherwise, unanimity
by the Council is still required in order to take a decision that
departs from the Parliament's amendment proposals. The basic
principle is that the Council can depart from Commission pro-
posals only by unanimity, and is contained in Article 149(1) of
the EEC Treaty, now Article 189a(1) of the EC Treaty. Article
149(2) of the EEC Treaty was incorporated by the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union into Article 189(c) of the EC Treaty. Within the
framework of the collaboration procedure, the sole responsibil-
ity of the Council remains upheld, even if the procedures by
which the Council takes a decision can be influenced by the Par-
liament. This outcome of the negotiations on the Single Euro-
pean Act failed to meet the demands of the European Parlia-
ment and the concept that different Member States had of the
strengthening of the position of the Parliament. For this reason,
the Parliament was allocated a genuine power of co-decision in
Articles 237 and 238 of the EEC Treaty. According to these arti-
cles, the assent of the Parliament is required both for the acces-
sion of a new Member State and to conclude an association
agreement. Both provisions were adopted in the Maastricht
Treaty. Thus, under Article 228(3), the conclusion of associa-
tion agreements within the meaning of Article 238, together
with such agreements that establish a specific institutional frame-
work by organizing cooperative structures, agreements having
important budgetary implications, or amending an act adopted
under the co-decision procedure under Article 189b, must be
32. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 149(2) (providing applicable procedure when
Council acts in cooperation with European Parliament).
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accepted by the Parliament."3
The admission of Member States is now governed by Article
0 of the Treaty on European Union in such a way that an acces-
sion is possible only to the Union and not limited to the Euro-
pean Communities. 4 The Parliament must assent to such an ac-
cession. Therefore, the Parliament is accorded a power that af-
fects not only the European Community, but also the Union as a
whole, i.e., also Titles V and VI on cooperation, even though
collaboration by the Parliament in the implementation of the
cooperation is not given. The Treaty of Maastricht extended the
scope of application of the assent procedure. Thus, the EC
Treaty under Article 8a, which concerns the exercise of the right
of every citizen of the Union to reside within the territory of the
Member States, requires the assent of the Parliament.35
Furthermore, the provisions for the Parliament's elections
by direct universal suffrage, established in Article' 138(3) of the
EC Treaty, in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Mem-
ber States, can be decided upon by the Council, only with the
Parliament's assent, and then recommended to the Member
States for adoption.35 There is no provision for the assent of the
Parliament to the provisions on the system of own resources. Ac-
cording to the second subparagraph of Article 201 of the EC
Treaty, the Council simply has to consult the Parliament. A dis-
crepancy continues in the budgetary field. The Parliament has,
in the framework of Article 203 of the EC Treaty, genuine pow-
ers of decision as regards expenditure,37 but these powers are
nevertheless limited by revenues, which were decided upon with-
out participation by the Parliament.
33. EC Treaty, supra note, art. 228(3). "[Slhall be concluded after the assent of
the European Parliament has been obtained." Id.
34. TEU, supra note 1, art. 0, 1 1 ("Any European State may apply to become a
Member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act
unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the Eu-
ropean Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component mem-
bers.").
35. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8a(2) ("[T]he Council shall act unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the assent of the European Parlia-
ment.").
36. Id. art. 138(3), 1 2.
37. Id. art. 203.
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D. The Co-Decision Procedure
The cases in which the Parliament's assent to Council deci-
sions is necessary are limited in number and generally speaking
do not entail the legislative functions necessary for the develop-
ment and functioning of the Community. For the latter, the
Maastricht Treaty introduced, in Article 189b of the EC Treaty, a
so-called co-decision procedure.3 8 This applies wherever provi-
sion is made therefore in the article of the EC Treaty that is re-
lied upon as legal basis. Doubtless the most important case of
application is Article 100a, which is the legal basis for all meas-
ures for the realization of the internal market. The procedure,
as with other procedures, is set in motion by a proposal from the
Commission. This proposal, however, must be submitted not
only to the Council but also to the European Parliament.
The first reading in this procedure corresponds to the coop-
eration procedure, which is now laid down in Article 189(c).
The Council, acting by a qualified majority, adopts a common
position after obtaining the opinion of the European Parlia-
ment. For this stage of the procedure, the question arises
whether the Council, pursuant to Article 189a(1) can unani-
mously amend the legal basis and so prevent the co-decision pro-
cedure from being carried out. This issue took on practical form
in a cooperation procedure in connection with the preparation
of the directive on waste from the titanium dioxide industry. 9
The Commission had based its proposal on Article 100a of the
EEC Treaty, which at that time made provision for the coopera-
tion procedure. The Council had, albeit after renewed consulta-
tion with the Parliament, amended the legal basis and based its
decision on Article 130s of the EEC Treaty, which provides sim-
ply for the Parliament to be consulted.4" This action by the
Council gives rise to serious concern. It runs counter to the ba-
sic concept of the cooperation procedure, the object of which is
to provide a structure for cooperation between the Council and
the Parliament and to give the Parliament more influence.
There is an irreconcilability here in that the Council unani-
mously restricts the rights of the Parliament. In a judgment on
38. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189 b.
39. Council Directive No. 91/156/EEC, OJ. L 78/32 (1991).
40. See Koen Lenaerts, The P3indple of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the Euro-
pean Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FoRDm INT'L LJ. 846, 871-75 (1994).
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an action brought by the Commission against the Council which
relied upon the choice of criteria for the legal basis, the Court of
Justice took no position on the procedural question outlined
above.4 1 The concern that exists in connection with the cooper-
ation procedure must exist to a greater extent with regard to the
co-decision procedure under Article 189b of the EC Treaty. An
amendment, reached unanimously by the Council as to the legal
basis, would encroach to an even greater degree on the rights of
the Parliament as laid down in the provision. These rights in-
clude, as opposed to those in the cooperation procedure, the
possibility for the Parliament to prevent a decision of the Coun-
cil, whereas in the cooperation procedure, rejection by the Par-
liament can be unanimously overturned by the Council.
Where the Parliament does not agree with the common po-
sition of the Council, it can propose changes or even express its
intention of rejecting the common position. Such conduct by
the Parliament affords the Council the opportunity to convene a
Conciliation Committee in order to explain its position to the
Parliament within the Committee. This Committee is compara-
ble to a certain extent with the Committee which was envisaged
in the concertation procedure, albeit with the difference that in
the concertation procedure the Council held the reins as re-
gards how to proceed. In the co-decision procedure, the Parlia-
ment determines how things are to proceed. The Parliament
can either, with an absolute majority of its members, confirm the
rejection of the common position or propose amendments. To
the extent that there is no absolute majority in the Parliament,
neither for rejection nor for amendment, the Parliament takes
no stand on the common position but simply announces its in-
tention of rejecting it. Thus, the Council can, according to Arti-
cle 189b(2) (b), adopt the legal act in accordance with its com-
mon position.42 Blocking of the Council requires an absolute
majority in the Parliament at each stage of the co-decision proce-
dure. This provision ensures that the law-making procedure in
the Community cannot be blocked in plenary session by a simple
majority that has arisen fortuitously. This danger exists above all
because frequently in plenary sessions only relatively few Mem-
41. Commission v. Council, Case C-300/89, (1991] E.C.L 2867, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R.
359 (Titanium Dioxide].
42. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189 b(2) (b).
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bers of Parliament are present. Furthermore, the presence of
the quorum has to be verified only on application by a Member
and not ex officio by the President.
If the Parliament decides by absolute majority to propose
amendments to the common position of the Council, the Coun-
cil is informed thereof now. The Parliament's influence on the
way in which the Council formulates its objectives is nonetheless
rendered relative to the extent that the Commission has to give
its opinion on these amendments. If the Commission agrees to
the Parliament's proposals, the Council can take a decision by a
qualified majority approving the amendments as proposed by
the Parliament. If the Commission rejects the Parliament's pro-
posals, however, the Council can act unanimously without taking
account of the Parliament's proposals. Once this is done, the
procedure is concluded by the Council. Only where the Council
does not approve the act in question is a Conciliation Commit-
tee convened.
In this Committee, the Parliament once more has the possi-
bility of influencing the formulation of objectives. In the Com-
mittee, which is composed of all Members of the Council or
their representatives and an equal number of representatives of
the Parliament, an effort is made to reach agreement on a joint
text. Ajoint text is arrived at when it is agreed to by the qualified
majority of the Council and the majority of the representatives
of the European Parliament. The joint text is subsequently only
accepted as a legal act when it has been adopted by the Council
by a qualified majority and by the European Parliament with an
absolute majority of the votes cast. This affords the Parliament
the possibility of preventing adoption of the proposed legal act.
If the Conciliation Committee falls to come up with ajoint text,
the Council, acting by a qualified majority, can decide upon the
legal act in accordance with the common position to which it
agreed before the conciliation procedure was initiated, possibly
with taking into account the amendments proposed by the Euro-
pean Parliament. Yet, even in this case, it is possible for the Par-
liament, by an absolute majority of its component Members, to
reject the promulgation of the legal act and thus to bring the
procedure to an end.
It must be noted that in the so-called co-decision procedure,
pursuant to Article 189b, the contribution made by the Parlia-
ment has been reinforced when compared with the cooperation
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procedure. There can be no talk, however, of any genuine co-
decision by the Parliament under the budgetary procedure in
Article 203 and those cases, envisaged by the Treaty, that require
the Parliament's assent for Council decisions. In the one in-
stance, the Council can adopt a legal act without any contribu-
tion by the Parliament under Article 189b(2) (b), whenever the
Parliament has not taken a decision. On the other hand, pursu-
ant to paragraph 3, the Council can unanimously disregard any
proposal for amendment made by the Parliament. Only where
the Council does not take such a decision is it possible for the
Parliament to reject the promulgation of a legal act on the basis
of a joint text or, without this, with the absolute majority of its
members.
II. THE COOPERATION SCHEME
According to Article E, the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the Commission, and the Court of Justice shall exercise their
powers under the conditions and for the purposes provided for,
on the one hand, by the provisions of the Treaties establishing
the European Communities and of the subsequent Treaties and
Acts modifying and supplementing them and, on the other
hand, by the other provisions of the Maastricht Treaty.4  The
provisions on a common foreign and security policy" and on
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs45 delegate
tasks to the Council and the Commission and, in a marginal way,
to the Parliament. Nevertheless, Article L excludes the applica-
tion of Community law to Titles V and VI.46 Judicial review by
the Court ofJustice does not take place in this instance. Articles
J.11 and K9 simply declare as applicable only those articles of
the EC Treaty that concern the composition of the Council, the
Commission, and the Parliament. Furthermore, according to
ArticleJ.11, Article 217 of the EC Treaty,.which affords the legal
basis for settling the language question, is applicable.47
As for the rest, the formulation of objectives and the deci-
sion-making procedure do not take place according to the pro-
43. TEU, supra note 1, art. E.
44. Id tit. V.
45. Id tit. VI.
46. Id. art. L.
47. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 217.
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cedural provisions contained in the Community treaties. The
Commission has no monopoly of initiative to force the Council,
by means of proposals, to introduce a procedure to take a deci-
sion. The Commission is fully associated only with the work of
cooperation of the Member States.4" For this reason, the Com-
mission can only make an attempt, by relying upon its political
weight and material contributions in negotiations within the
Council, to promote cooperation between the Member States.
Thus, decisions can be taken, on the basis of the amorphous ini-
tiative, by the Commission, or each Member State.49 Only the
European Council can, in the context of cooperation in foreign
policy, induce the Council to take decisions. Pursuant to Article
J.3, the Council decides, on the basis of general guidelines from
the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of
joint action.50 It should be emphasized that a corresponding
provision is lacking in the Community Treaties, i.e., that cooper-
ation in the field of foreign policy is subject to direct influence
by the European Council, whereas for the Communities only Ar-
ticle D is valid.51 According to Article D, the European Council
shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its devel-
opment and shall define the general political guidelines
thereof.52 This makes it clear that the European Council, which
has a more inter-governmental character, cannot, legally consid-
ered, intervene in the procedural structures of the Community.
This, however, is the case for cooperation in foreign policy
under ArticleJ.3(1).2 Decisions of the Council are taken unani-
mously.54 The Council may decide unanimously to take imple-
mentation measures by a qualified majority. The concept of
"unanimity" in Titles V and VI means that all Member States
must agree, because Article 148 of the EC Treaty does not apply.
According to Article 148, abstention from voting by one Member
State of the Council shall not prevent the adoption by the Coun-
cil of acts that require unanimity.55 In practice, this means that
48. Id. arts.J.9, K4.
49. Id. 'arts.J.8(3), K.3(2).
50. Id. artJ..
51. Id. art. D.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. J.3(1) ("The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines
from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject ofjoint action.").
54. Id. arts. J.3, F-4.
55. Id. art. 148.
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every Member State has a right to veto in the framework of coop-
eration.
The European Parliament does not take part in the deci-
sion-making procedure in the context of cooperation between
Member States. According to Articles J.7 and K.6, the Parlia-
ment simply has the right to be informed by the Presidency or
the Commission and to submit to the Presidency its views on out-
standing issues.56 The Presidency ensures that these views are
taken into consideration. Thus, consultation of the Parliament
by the Presidency is not a prerequisite for the Council's taking a
decision, as is the case with regard to the Parliament's position
in the system of Community law. In addition, the Parliament
may ask questions of the Council and make recommendations to
it. Yet, as can be seen from the choice of wording, these too do
not result in any binding effect.
It is through decisions of the Council that common posi-
tions and joint actions in matters covered by the foreign and se-
curity policy 7 and joint positions, joint action, and recommen-
dations to accept agreements in the fields of cooperation injus-
tice and home affairs can be taken58 are decided upon. The
decisions do not take the form envisaged for acts of the Commu-
nity in Article 189 of the EC Treaty. Article 17 of the Council's
Rules of Procedure of 6 December 1993, prescribes a different
formulation for these decisions.5 9 According to Article 18(3) of
the Council's Rules of Procedure, publication of these decisions
in the Official Journal of the European Union shall be decided
on a case by case basis.
Apart from the form, these decisions cannot be granted the
legal binding effect defined in Article 189 of the EC Treaty.60
Binding effect can only be of the nature of international law.
Thus, Article J.2 establishes a duty on the part of Member States
to ensure that their national policies conform with the common
positions of the Community.61 ArticleJ.3 (4) reads, 'Joint actions
shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and
56. Id. arts. J.7, K.6.
57. Id. art. J.3.
58. Id. art. K.3.
59. Rules of Procedure, supra note 26, O.J. L 304/1 (1993).
60. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189(4) ("A decision shall be binding in its entirety
upon those to whom it is addressed.").
61. TEU, supra note 1, art. J.2.
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in the conduct of their activity." 2
In Title VI, providing cooperation in the fields of justice
and home affairs, there are no corresponding provisions. All the
same, one will have to proceed on the assumption that the joint
positions and joint measures decided upon under Article KS3
should have binding effect in accordance with the will of the
parties concluding the EC Treaty.6" This is the result not only of
the fact that the wording is identical to the terminology used in
ArticlesJ.2 andJ.3, but also that the representation ofjoint posi-
tions and the implementation of joint measures presupposes,
through the necessity of the terms used, that the Member States
are bound by the decisions of the Council.
These observations indicate that cooperation in the fields
covered by Titles V and VI takes place outside and indepen-
dently of the scope of the Community legal system. In as much
as ,this cooperation takes place in the Council and with participa-
tion by the Commission, these two bodies do not, despite coop-
eration being integrated into the Community's infrastructure,
act as Community institutions. One can refer to this situation as
one in which bodies act on a lending-out basis. In the fields of
justice and home affairs, they can only be active as Community
institutions when the Council decides, pursuant to Article K.9,
that Article 100c of the EC Treaty should apply to certain fields
of cooperation. This type of decision needs ratification by the
Member States and thus represents a Treaty amendment that
does not follow the general provisions of Article N on the proce-
dure for amendment of the Treaty.64
III. BRIDGES BETWEEN THE EC AND COOPERATION
In a few cases, the bodies of the Community can, in the con-
text of Community law-making, be active in fields covered by Ti-
tes V and VI. Article I assigns the provisions on the crossing
of external borders, the entry of third country nationals, and
their right to residence in the Member States to intergovern-
mental cooperation. Similarly, Article 100c of the EC Treaty
provides that the Council, on a proposal from the Commission,
determines which countries' nationals have to be in possession
62. Id. art.J.3(4).
63. Id. art. K3.
64. Id. art. N.
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of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Community.65
The Commission can submit proposals that do not correspond
to the guidelines decided upon in the field of cooperation, be-
cause the Commission is not bound by decisions taken in the
context of cooperation. In these situations, the Council, in ac-
cordance with Article 189 of the EC Treaty, can depart from the
Commission proposal only unanimously.66 A conflict may arise
between an act concluded pursuant to the Community proce-
dure and a decision taken pursuant to Article K4, if the Member
States do not abide by the decision taken in the context of coop-
eration when voting in the Council.
In the framework of cooperation in the field of foreign and
security policy, where there is provision for action by the Com-
munity to impose sanctions, such sanctions are decided upon on
a proposal from the Commission and by the Council of the Com-
munity acting by a qualified majority.6' Action by the Commu-
nity is necessary when the sanctions decided upon call for meas-
ures that fall within the competence of the Community, for ex-
ample, when commercial policy sanctions are concerned.
According to Article M of the TEU, the Community Treaties re-
main unaffected thereby.6" On the other hand, the Community
cannot take action if the measures decided upon in the frame-
work of cooperation do not fall within the competence of the
Community. This is the result of the principle of limited individ-
ual conferment of powers, as laid down in Article 4 of the EC
Treaty.69 In addition, the Commission can decide whether it
wishes to make a proposal and, if necessary, the type of propo-
sal.70 For the Commission to be legally bound to the decisions
taken in the context of cooperation may not be inferred from
the fact that Member States are bound under international law
to these decisions. Indeed, this would not reconcile with the in-
dependence and the status of the Commission in the inter-insti-
tutional structure. Article 157(2) of the EC Treaty expressly for-
65. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100c. These decisions are now taken unani-
mously, but afterJanuary 1, 1996, a qualified majority will suffice.
66. Id. art. 189a.
67. Id. art. 228a.
68. TEU, supra note 1, art. M.
69. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 4(2) ("Each institution shall act within the limits
of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty.").
70. Id. art. 228a, 1 1 ("[T]he Council shall take the necessary urgent measures.").
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bids members of the Commission from taking instructions from
any government or from any other body.7 Should the Commis-
sion put forward proposals that depart from the measures de-
cided upon between the Member States, then it is equally valid
that the Council can depart from them only unanimously.
72
There is no provision for a position to be taken by the Parlia-
ment for decisions taken pursuant to Article 228a. When meas-
ures need to be taken pursuant to Article 228a, they are regu-
larly autonomous measures and not the conclusion of agree-
ments with third states. Article 228(3) requires participation by
the Parliament when concluding international agreements and
therefore does not apply.
Thus, in the field of budgetary law, the Parliament does
have the possibility, legally watertight but nonetheless limited, to
influence the cooperation of the Member States as provided
under Titles V and VI of the TEU. According to Articles J.11
and K8, administrative expenditures shall be charged to the
budget of the European Communities. Furthermore, the Coun-
cil may decide unanimously that operational expenditures
should also be charged to the budget of the European Commu-
nities. In this case, explicit provision is given in both Articles to
the application Of the budgetary procedure envisaged in the EC
Treaty. Article 203 of the EC Treaty gives the Parliament a genu-
ine right to take decisions alongside the Council." When deal-
ing with non-compulsory expenditures, i.e., expenditures that do
not necessarily result from the Treaty or from acts adopted in
accordance therewith, the Parliament can also take decisions on
budgetary estimates that run counter to the will of the Council.
Administrative expenditures, especially expenditures on staff,
are treated as non-compulsory expenditures according to an
agreement between the Council and the Parliament.
Even if officials of the organs of the Community are active
in the fields of cooperation, they retain their status on the basis
71. Id. art. 157(2). "The members of the Commission shall, in the general interest
of the Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties. In
the performance of these duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any
government or from any other body." Id.
72. Id. art. 189a.
73. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 203.
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of the Staff Regulations."4 The Parliament can influence the
staff plan only in so far as it is possible to establish which officials
work exclusively or substantially for the fields of cooperation.
Some indication is given by the fact that both the Commission
and the General Secretariat of the Council have formed special
Directorates-General for the area of cooperation in the field of
foreign and security policy.
In as much as the Council decides to enter operational ex-
penditure in the budget of the Community, the Parliament's
ability to influence likewise depends on whether compulsory or
noncompulsory expenditure is at issue. This question should be
of greater importance to the Parliament than concern with ad-
ministrative expenditures because the decision for budget esti-
mates directly influences the implementation of the measures
decided upon. There is a strong argument for allocating opera-
tional expenditures as non-compulsory and thereby to accord
the Parliament "the last word." This expenditure is not by way of
necessity resulting from the EC Treaty or the legal acts adopted
on the basis of the Treaty. The Community or its institutions
cannot, as has been demonstrated, be considered legally bound
by the decisions taken in the field of cooperation. Thus, the Par-
liament's constant practice has been to reject any legal effect of
decisions that did not come into being as law-making acts of the
Community. For example, the Parliament, as early as 1974, de-
cided on a budget estimate for the proposed regional fund that
exceeded by one million ECU the amount decided upon by the
European Council.
Where estimates are entered in the budget of the Commu-
nity for the implementation of cooperation, the rule in Article
205 of the EC Treaty addresses the implementation of the
budget."- According to Article 205, the budget is implemented
by the Commission. Article 22(l) of the Financial Regulation76
repeats this provision. Under paragraph 2 of Article 22, the pow-
ers necessary for the implementation of the sections in the
budget concerning the European Parliament, the Council, the
Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors are conferred on
74. Council Regulation No. 259/68/EEC/ETRATOM/ECSC, art. 2, l1J.O. L 56/
1 (1968), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, at 4.
75. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 205.
76. OJ. C 80/1, at 12 (1991).
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these bodies by the Commission." These sections comprise the
administrative expenditure of each respective body. Special
problems should not arise for the administrative expenditure
that arises in the field of cooperation. Although, the Commis-
sion has not hitherto formally recognized these relevant powers,
it is accepted practice that the other bodies nevertheless carry
them out. If estimates for operational expenditure in the field
of cooperation were not entered in the section of the Commis-
sion, but in the Council, this would run counter to the practice
hitherto. This practice establishes that operational expenditure
is conducted for the execution of Community policies under the
responsibility of the independent Commission with only the ad-
ministrative expenditure of the other bodies being entrusted to
them. In an emergency, the Commission would have the oppor-
tunity to bring an action and claim validly that conferment
within the meaning of Article 22(2) of the Financial Regulation
did not take place.
Apart from the practical point of view that the infrastruc-
ture of the General Secretariat of the Council would have to be
adjusted to the new tasks and, in all probability, enlarged for the
administration of the operational expenditure, it suggests itself
that the matter should be clarified by an amendment to the Fi-
nancial Regulation. An amendment would have to be decided
upon, pursuant to Article 209 of the EC Treaty, by the Council
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and af-
ter consulting the Parliament and obtaining the opinion of the
Court of Auditors. 78 Further, an amendment to the practice
would mean that control by the European Parliament, as the
Parliament in general exercises it over the Commission, would
not be possible for the implementation of this part of the
budget. In every case, there is nevertheless control by the Court
of Auditors in accordance with Article 188c of the EC Treaty.
The annual report by the Court of Auditors would also concern
this expenditure. This annual report forms the basis of the pro-
cedure, governed by Article 206 of the EC Treaty, for the grant-
ing of a discharge for the implementation of the budget.79 Arti-
cle 206 provides that the European Parliament shall give a dis-
77. Id. art. 22(2), O.J. C 80/1, at 12 (1991).
78. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 209.
79. IM art. 206.
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charge to the Commission.80 This reflects the basis already
referred to above that the Commission and not the Council is
responsible for the operational expenditure in the budget of the
Community. An amendment to the Financial Regulation along
the lines sketched out above would limit control by the Parlia-
ment in terms of the discharge it gives to the Commission.
IV. GENERAL OBITGATIONS OF MEMBER-STATES
According to Article M, the Treaty on European Union
does not affect the Community Treaties.8 1 This means that deci-
sions within the framework of the system of cooperation cannot
be taken on those particular subject matters that fall within an
exclusive or potential responsibility of the Community institu-
tions. The provision laid down in Article M has further legal
consequences. The Member States are not, in the field of coop-
eration, released from the duties incumbent upon them by vir-
tue of Article 5 of the EC Treaty. According to that provision,
they have to take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of their obligations arising out
of Community law. 2 In addition, they have a duty to abstain
from any measure that could jeopardize the attainment of the
objectives of the Treaty.
A finding by the Court of Justice has made it clear that the
provision laid down in Article 5 is not a declaration of principle,
but that the provision gives rise to a concrete obligation on the
part of Member States that, if not taken into account, amounts
to an infringement of the Treaty by the Member State con-
cerned. 4 Thus, the Court of Justice may examine decisions
taken by the Member States in the context of areas of coopera-
tion to see if they reconcile with Community law.85 This action is
not available to the Parliament, because, according to Article
173 EC Treaty, it can take action only against the Council for the
80. Id.
81. TEU, supra note 1, art. M ("[Niothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties
establishing the European Communities or the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying
or supplementing them.").
82. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5.
83. I
84. Commission v. Italy, Case 39/72, [1973] E.C.R. 101, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439.
85. This situation arises when the Commission brings proceedings for infringe-
ment of the EC Treaty under Article 169. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169.
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purpose of protecting its prerogatives.88 Because the Council
does not act in the field of cooperation as an institution of the
Community, an action by the Parliament against the Council
should not be admissible. In addition, it appears difficult to con-
ceive that the rights of the Parliament should be jeopardized by
decisions in the field of cooperation. It is, however, the case that
there exist powers for the Parliament to bring an action, pursu-
ant to Article 173, where legal acts are being contested accord-
ing to Article 100c or Article 228a or where decisions in the con-
text of the budgetary procedure are concerned.
CONCLUSION
Through the Treaty on European Union, the development
of the Community's structures for decision-making continued.
Under the decision making procedure in the area of the Com-
munity legal system, the tendencies that were to be detected
hitherto are being carried on. This is particularly so for the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the procedures for voting in the Council.
The wholly new structures for the development of objectives in
the areas covered by. Titles V and VI represent a structuring of
the hitherto inconsistent cooperation of Member States in the
most varied fields of policy and thereby afford the possibility for
greater coherence in the development of the Union. At the
same time, however, the relationship between the field of the
Communities and that of cooperation remains, legally speaking,
problematical. It remains to be seen whether the implementa-
tion of the new systems results in a clearer scenario that makes a
more reliable legal analysis possible.
The next step envisaged in the development of the decision-
making procedures is, according to Article 189b(8) of the EC
Treaty, a governmental conference scheduled to take place in
1996.7 It appears certain that such a conference will concern
itself not only with Article 189b of the EC Treaty. Until the EC
Treaty is amended, which could be decided upon by a govern-
mental conference, further development of Community law and
86. Id. art. 173.
87. Id. art. 189b(8) ('The scope of the procedure under this Article may be wid-
ened, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article N(2) of the Treaty on
European Union, on the basis of a report to be submitted to the Council by the Com-
mission by 1996 at the latest.").
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of the law of the Union will be determined, as hitherto, by the
law as applied in practice. Along with new decisions taken by the
Court ofJustice, inter-institutional agreements will play a signifi-
cant role in this process. It appears to be too early at the mo-
ment, however, to analyze these agreements and to .give them
any legal classification. To date, only a small number have come
into being. Nevertheless, the Parliament has called for various
agreements that predominantly concern the decision-making
procedure both in the context of the Community and in the
fields of cooperation under Titles V and VI of the TEU.
